Return or Final Departure: Does Post-War Ukraine Risk Finding Itself in an Empty House?

Construction cranes, new bridges, gleaming facades, and revived factories — this is precisely how most of us picture the long-awaited Victory Day. We are used to measuring the future in tons of concrete and GDP growth percentages. However, there is a quiet, almost invisible tripwire that the country risks stepping on immediately after the cessation of hostilities.

Who, in fact, will live in these rebuilt cities? Who will stand at the machine tools, teach children, reopen coffee shops, and pay taxes?

The website of the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine has published a fundamental popular science article by Kateryna Ivashchenko, Candidate of Sociological Sciences, under the telling title: “Migration Intentions of Ukrainians: Pre-War Trends, Current State, and Future Prospects.” This study is not merely dry statistics, but a sobering mirror into which we ought to look today.

To understand the scale of the current shift, sociologists suggest looking at the trajectory of our migration intentions over more than three decades of independence.

·         Ecological Anxiety of the 90s: At the dawn of independence, people cited... ecology as the primary driver of potential relocation. The aftermath of Chornobyl was all too fresh. In 1994, nearly one in five respondents (19%) cited the ecological factor as a reason to move.

·         Job Hunting and the Normalization of Movement: Over time, the economy moved to the forefront. While in 1994 only 7% of Ukrainians considered moving for a new job, by 2020 this figure had reached 23%. Relocation became an ordinary life choice rather than a disaster.

·         Civilizational Shift: The geography shifted as well. In 1994, 13% of respondents expressed a desire to move to Russia; by 2020, that figure had dropped to a mere 2%. The events of 2014 conclusively turned Ukrainians toward the European space, a trend reaffirmed by the visa-free regime in 2017. On the eve of the full-scale war (in 2021), 45% of Ukrainians had visited the EU.

Thus, on the eve of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian society had not become a society of mass emigration, yet it had grown significantly more open to mobility. The share of people considering a move abroad for work, education, or personal reasons was increasing, as was the proportion of those who already had labor migration experience.

Nevertheless, despite the growth in mobility, Ukrainian society remained fairly settled. Up until 2020, about 60–65% of citizens consistently stated that they would not want to leave their permanent place of residence.

The war shattered this constant completely.

Today, after more than four years of grueling war, forced migration has turned into a profound social transformation. In the first months of 2022, people fled with a single suitcase and lived with the thought of a swift return. But time is an unforgiving healer and, simultaneously, a subtle divider.

In 2024, the employment rate among working-age Ukrainians reached 78% in Poland, 72% in Lithuania, 69% in the United Kingdom, and exceeded 60% in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, and the Netherlands.

At the same time, a significant portion of Ukrainians work below their qualification levels: diplomas, professional experience, and social status acquired in Ukraine do not always convert into corresponding positions in a new country.

Furthermore, due to their temporary protection status, a substantial number of Ukrainians who left after 2022 experience instability in their situation owing to difficulties in renting housing and finding permanent employment, not to mention the consequences of years-long family separation.

However, the length of stay is gradually altering plans, partly due to the “rooting” of the younger generation of Ukrainians in host countries.

Children who left as toddlers have already developed in a different linguistic and cultural environment, made school friends, and are planning their futures. Mothers have had their diplomas recognized, built careers, or launched their own businesses.

Temporary daily life has imperceptibly acquired comfort and a sense of a predictable tomorrow, whereas returning to Ukraine is associated with economic instability and the threat of shelling.

According to survey data from the Centre for Economic Strategy, while at the end of 2022, 74% of surveyed Ukrainians abroad expressed their intention to return to Ukraine, by spring 2023 this figure fell to 63%, in early 2024 to 53%, and by late 2024 to just 43%. Concurrently, the proportion of those who definitely plan to return has dropped by more than half — from 50% down to 20%.

According to the estimates relied upon by Kateryna Ivashchenko, Candidate of Sociological Sciences, we are dealing with a tragic dynamic: only a third to a half of Ukrainians abroad are ready to return. The longer the war continues, the deeper these roots grow into European soil.

Sociologists warn: the lifting of martial law could trigger a second wave of emigration — when men head out to join their families, who are already settled and waiting in Europe.

In all likelihood, post-war migration will be far more diverse than can be imagined today.

Alongside return and definitive non-return, repeat moves, temporary visits, living between two countries, trans-border families, remote work, and other forms of spatially distributed life will become increasingly widespread.

Even today, many Ukrainians are trans-local — integrating into their host countries while simultaneously maintaining close familial, professional, economic, and civic ties with Ukraine.

Simultaneously, under a favorable post-war recovery scenario, Ukraine could gradually transform not only into a country of return for its own citizens, but also into a country of immigration. A mass influx of new migrants immediately after the end of the war is unlikely, but over a longer horizon, economic reconstruction, labor shortages, and integration into the European space could make Ukraine attractive to foreign workers and those who emigrated earlier.

Scientists at the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine emphasize: the struggle for human capital will be a test for the state no less complex than repelling the aggressor. And winning it through dry slogans about “patriotism” will not work.

A person chooses with their heart, but makes decisions with their mind. For millions of our compatriots to decide to link their future with Ukraine, the state must offer clear answers:

·         Safety: Restored homes and a protected sky.

·         Economic Dignity: Jobs with competitive wages and opportunities for business development.

·         Justice: A sense that the state values and protects every citizen.

If we fail to create these conditions right now, without waiting for the final salvo of the war, we risk rebuilding perfectly empty cities. And that is a luxury Ukraine simply cannot afford.